Contracts by Theus, Walter W., Jr.
South Carolina Law Review 
Volume 30 Issue 1 Article 6 
1979 
Contracts 
Walter W. Theus Jr. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Walter W. Theus Jr., Contracts, 30 S. C. L. Rev. 36 (1979). 
This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please 
contact dillarda@mailbox.sc.edu. 
CONTRACTS
I. OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE
In Cain v. Noel,I the South Carolina Supreme Court was
presented with a question of basic contract law: can an offer
containing no explicit termination date be revoked by a general
deadline for all offers contained in prior correspondence between
the parties? The court did not, however, decide the case on the
issue as framed in the briefs of the parties. Instead, it adopted its
own theory and the logic of the resulting opinion is questionable.
The litigation arose from negotiations between plaintiff
Cain, Chief School Administrator of Edgefield County, and de-
fendants, members of the School Board of Edgefield County. The
negotiations concerned plaintiff's continued employment by the
Board. On June 20, 1975, plaintiff offered to resign in exchange
for a full year's pay. The following day he received a letter from
the Board rejecting his offer. This letter concluded: "In any
event, the alternative mentioned above, or any other alternative,
will be terminated by the Board after twelve o'clock, noon, on
Friday, June 27, 1975 .. ."I On June 26 plaintiff received a
written proposal offering to pay him six months salary in return
for his resignation. On June 30, he delivered to defendants his
resignation and a letter explaining that he was responding to the
offer of June 26. Later that evening, defendants telephoned plain-
tiff, stating that the Board accepted his resignation, but refused
to pay him the six months salary. This conversation was followed
on July 3 by a letter from defendants to plaintiff; the letter stated
that the Board had accepted the resignation and expressly re-
ferred to the June 30 telephone conversation. Alleging that they
had breached a contract to pay him the six months salary plain-
tiff sued the members of the Board. The jury found in favor of
defendants. Plaintiff appealed to the supreme court claiming that
the trial judge erred in refusing to grant his motions for a directed
verdict, a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or a new trial .
3
The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed and found that the
evidence was susceptible to only one reasonable inference. Be-
cause that inference supported plaintiff's claim, the judge should
1. 268 S.C. 583, 235 S.E.2d 292 (1977).
2. Record at 50. "[The alternative mentioned above" was apparently that Cain
resign immediately, with pay. Id. at 12.
3. Brief for Appellant at iii.
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have granted the motion for a directed verdict.'
The issue raised on appeal concerned common-law principles
of offer and acceptance. Basic contract law provides that an of-
feror is master of the offer, and may place any condition upon its
acceptance.' In their briefs, the parties argued whether the June
27 deadline should apply to defendants' June 26 offer to plaintiff.
Defendants cited general authority that allows the offeror to es-
tablish the cutoff point for the power of acceptance.6 Plaintiff,
while acknowledging the validity of this rule, argued that the
time limitation was not communicated with sufficient definite-
ness, and therefore that he had a reasonable time to accept the
offer.' The court found, however, that plaintiff's resignation and
letter of June 30 constituted a counter-offer which subsequently
was accepted by the Board. The court found that the June 26 offer
expired at noon on June 27, because the language in defendant's
June 20 letter provided that "any other alternative" would expire
on that day.' If the court had confined itself to the issues argued
in the parties' briefs, this finding would have mandated affirm-
ance of the verdict and judgment of the lower court.
Plaintiff's letters constituted a counter-offer. If an offer con-
tains an express provision limiting the time for acceptance the
provision must be complied with, or the offer will lapse when the
deadline passes.' If the offeree thereafter attempts to accept the
offer, this purported acceptance will not form a contract. A late
acceptance, however, is effective as a counter-offer, which, if ac-
cepted by the original offeror, will create a contract. 0 The court
clearly was correct in finding that plaintiffs June 30 letters were
4. 268 S.C. at 586, 235 S.E.2d at 293. The venerable rule is that a party is entitled to
a directed verdict if only one inference may be reasonably drawn from the facts. Dunsil
v. E.M. Jones Chevrolet Co., Inc., 268 S.C. 291, 233 S.E.2d 101 (1977); Kirkland v.
Hardwicke Chem. Co., 262 S.C. 520, 205 S.E.2d 831 (1974). This standard is made even
more stringent by requiring the trial court to consider the testimony in the light most
favorable to the party resisting the motion. Farr v. Duke Power Co., 265 S.C. 356, 218
S.E.2d 431 (1975); Hart v. Doe, 261 S.C. 116, 198 S.E.2d 526 (1973). It is therefore unusual
for an appellate court to overturn a jury verdict on the grounds that a verdict should have
been directed for the appellant.
5. "As the offeror is at liberty to make no offer at all he is also at liberty to dictate
whatever terms he sees fit if he chooses to make an offer." 1 S. WmusToN, CoNTRACTS §
53 (3d ed. 1957).
6. Brief for Respondents at 4.
7. Brief for Appellant at 6 (citing 1 A. CORBN, CONTRACTS § 36 (1963)).
8. 268 S.C. at 587, 235 S.E.2d at 293.
9. A. CoRBIN, CoNTRACTs § 35 (1963); 1 S. W=~soN, CONTRACS § 53 (3d ed. 1957);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 40 (Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-7, 1973).
10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 73 (Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-7, 1973).
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a counter-offer.
The court held, however, that the Board accepted this
counter-offer:
Appellant's resignation was tendered premised on the con-
tinuation of his salary through December, the identical terms of
the Board's lapsed offer. The Board's written acceptance of the
resignation expressed a consent to be bound by the terms of the
resignation and formed a binding contract between the parties.
Unqualified acceptance of the resignation bound the Board to
the terms of the resignation."
In two respects, this holding is contrary to general contract law
and to the facts as stated by the court. First, the court apparently
overlooked a basic premise of contract law: for a contract to exist,
mutual assent must be present. The common statement of this
principle is that a "meeting of the minds" of the parties must
occur.' 2 There is a serious question whether the minds of Cain and
the Board did meet. As the court recognized, plaintiff's resigna-
tion was tendered conditionally and could be accepted only if the
Board agreed to his salary proposal. During the telephone conver-
sation of June 30, the Board communicated to plaintiff a pur-
ported acceptance that undoubtedly varied the terms of the offer.
Refusing to pay plaintiffs salary rendered the acceptance ineffec-
tual, and the Board could rightly argue that no contract came
into existence.' 3
Second, the court opined that the written acceptance of the
resignation embodied in the July 8 letter from defendants to
plaintiff, expressed an "unqualified" consent to be bound. That
communication expressly referred to the conversation of June 30,
wherein plaintiff was informed that the Board would not pay his
salary. The court was therefore misguided in characterizing the
acceptance as "unqualified."'"
11. 268 S.C. at 587, 235 S.E.2d at 293-94 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
12. Kitchens v. Lee, 221 S.C. 59, 66, 69 S.E.2d 67, 69 (1952); Stein v. Xepapas, 204
S.C. 239, 246, 29 S.E.2d 257, 259 (1944).
13. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTs § 60 (Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-7 1973): "A
reply to an offer which purports to accept it but is conditional on the offeror's assent to
terms additional to or different from those offered is not an acceptance but is a counter-
offer." The Board's purported acceptance cannot be construed as merely requesting a
change in the terms of the offer, because the Board obviously would not bind itself to pay
plaintiff's salary and then naively ask that he agree not to accept it. See id. § 62.
14. Arguably, the court should have considered the telephone conversation and not
the subsequent letter in determining whether a contract was formed. Because plaintiff's
offer did not require the Board's written acceptance, the Board could accept in any
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A possible basis for the court to decide in plaintiff's favor, if
moved by the equities to do so, was presented by plaintiff's argu-
ment that for the time limit to be effective it had to be relayed
with sufficient definiteness.'" Because the court was constrained
to view the evidence in the light least favorable to plaintiff,'"
however, such a decision would undoubtedly have been unjusti-
fied. The supreme court was correct in resolving for defendant the
deadline issue briefed and argued. It was correct in holding that
plaintiff's purported acceptance of defendants' offer was a
counter-offer. Nevertheless, in an apparent attempt to avoid a
result it considered inequitable, the court erred in holding defen-
dant unconditionally accepted the counter-offer. While the final
disposition of this case should not offend anyone's sense of fair-
ness, the court's function is not to twist established rules of law
to reach a desired result. This practice can lead only to an unac-
ceptable degree of uncertainty in the law.
II. THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE AND COMMON-LAW CONTRACT
PRINCIPLES
The most important development in contract law in this cen-
tury was adoption of Article Two of the Uniform Commercial
Code (UCC) which deals with sales of goods. Much of Article Two
simply codifies preexisting contract law," though some provisions
were novel when introduced.'" Parties will try to bring a case
under the umbrella of Article Two to take advantage of favorable
sections. At times, however, the common law and the UCC will
lead to the same result.
In Ranger Construction Co. v. Dixie Floor Co.," the United
States District Court for the District of South Carolina had to
acceptance; therefore, the subsequent letter should be considered a mere confirmation of
the contract and not an acceptance itself.
15. See note 7 and accompanying text supra.
16. Plaintiff's ground for appeal was the trial judge's failure to grant his motion for
a directed verdict. See note 4 supra.
17. Professor Gilmore, speaking of the Code in its entirety, stated:
It derives from the common law, not the civil law, tradition. We shall do better
to think of it as a big statute-or a collection of statutes bound together in the
same book-which goes as far as it goes and no further. It assumes the continu-
ing existence of a large body of pre-Code and non-Code law on which it rests
for support, which it displaces to the least possible extent, and without which
it could not survive.
Gilmore, Article 9: What It Does for the Past, 26 LA. L. Rav. 285, 285-86 (1966).
18. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-312 to -318.
19. 433 F. Supp. 442 (D.S.C. 1977).
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decide whether the contract before it was governed by the Code
or by common-law principles. Defendant, a subcontractor, con-
tracted with plaintiff, a general contractor, to "furnish all materi-
als and labor for the installation of resilient flooring in the Clini-
cal Science Building at the Medical University of South Carolina
at Charleston." Defendant refused to perform and plaintiff had
to contract with another flooring dealer to perform the work at a
price allegedly $22,268 above that specified in the original con-
tract. Plaintiff filed suit for that amount.
Defendant admitted the validity of the contract, but claimed
its performance was excused because of circumstances that had
arisen during prior dealings with plaintiff. The parties had en-
tered into a similar contract just prior to signing the contract in
question. Under the prior contract defendant fully performed, but
plaintiff for no valid reason, refused to pay the amount due. De-
fendant reduced its claim to judgment before plaintiff paid any-
thing. Payment for the prior contract was finally received, but not
until after plaintiff requested, and defendant refused, to begin
work at the Medical University site.
On plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, defendant used
the prior contract as justification for its actions and based its
argument on two legal theories. First, the transaction was subject
to the provisions of Article Two of the UCC, 0 and under section
2-609 defendant was excused from performance. Second, the com-
mon law as embodied in section 280 of the First Restatement of
Contracts excused its refusal to perform. The court denied plain-
tiff's motion holding that a question of fact was raised under the
second theory."' The court's disposition of these two arguments is
considered separately below.
A. The Applicability of Article Two of the Uniform Commercial
Code
Defendant's primary argument was that there was an issue
of fact over whether Ranger's breach of the prior contract consti-
tuted "reasonable grounds for insecurity" under UCC section 2-
609.2 That section permits a contracting party who has reason-
able grounds for insecurity to suspend performance, demand as-
surance from the other party, and, if assurance is not forthcom-
20. S.C. CoDE ANN. §§ 36-2-101 to -809 (1976).
21. 433 F. Supp. 442 (D.S.C. 1977).
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ing, treat the contract as repudiated.? Plaintiff contended that
Article Two of the UCC did not apply to the transaction, because
the scope of Article Two as defined in section 2-102, applies only
to "transactions in goods.
124
Defendant argued that under its contract with plaintiff it
was required to furnish the flooring materials for the building and
that these materials were questionably "goods" as defined in the
Code.?
When goods are involved in a transaction, however, they do
not necessarily transform it into a "transaction in goods.126 If a
contract involving both services and materials is predominantly
one for rendering services, courts will not apply Article Two to
determine the rights and obligations of the parties.2 The court in
Ranger, quoting from Bonebrake v. Cox, 28 applied the following
test:
"The test for inclusion or exclusion [of contracts for goods and
services] is not whether they are mixed, but, granting that they
are mixed, whether their predominant factor, their thrust, their
purpose, reasonably stated, is the rendition of service with goods
incidentally involved (e.g., contract with artists for painting) or
23. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-609 (1976) provides:
Right to Adequate Assurance of Performance.
(1) A contract for sale imposes an obligation on each party that the other's
expectation of receiving due performance will not be impaired. When reasonable
grounds for insecurity arise with respect to the performance of either party the
other may in writing demand adequate assurance of due performance and until
he receives such assurance may if commercially reasonable suspend any per-
formance for which he has not already received the agreed return.
(2) Between merchants the reasonableness of grounds for insecurity and
the adequacy of any assurance offered shall be determined according to commer-
cial standards....
(4) After receipt of a justified demand failure to provide within a reason-
able time not exceeding thirty days such assurance of due performance as is
adequate under the circumstances of the particular case is a repudiation of the
contract.
24. U.C.C. § 2-102.
25. 433 F. Supp. at 444. See U.C.C. § 2-105(1), which defines goods as:
all things (including specially manufactured goods) which are movable at the
time of identification to the contract for sale other than the money in which the
price is to be paid, investment securities (Article 8) and things in action.
"Goods" also includes the unborn young of animals and growing crops and other
identified things attached to realty as described in the section on goods to be
severed from realty (Section 2-107).
26. R. NORDsTROM, LAW OF SALES § 22 (1970).
27. Id.
28. Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F.2d 951 (8th Cir. 1974).
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is a transaction of sale, with labor incidentally involved (e.g.,
installation of a water heater in a bathroom)."'"
Nothing is really profound about the Bonebrake formulation.
It simply requires a court to examine each case to determine
whether the sale or the service factor carries the greater weight.
In Ranger, the court found that the service element prevailed.
The court looked to the terms of the contract, wherein defendant
was referred to as a subcontractor, not as a materialman, and the
answers to interrogatories, which indicated that defendant's busi-
ness was not that of a wholesaler of flooring materials, but of an
installer of the materials. Furthermore, the determination that
the service element dominated was clearly supported by the re-
cord.
B. Section 280 of the Restatement (First) of Contracts as a
Common-Law Substitute for Section 2-609 of the Uniform
Commercial Code
Defendant also alleged a common-law defense to the breach
of contract action. Plaintiff argued in its brief that "the breach
of another and separate contract cannot be pled as a defense in a
contract action."3 Defendant argued, however, that plaintiff's
wrongful failure to pay under the prior contract indicated plain-
tiff's prospective unwillingness or inability to pay for perfor-
mance under the contract in issue, so that defendant was excused
from performance or was entitled to receive assurance of perform-
ance from plaintiff.3 1 This position was based upon the principle
of prospective failure of consideration stated in section 280 of the
Restatement (First) of Contracts:3
Manifestation by One Party of Inability to Perform or of Inten-
tion Not to Perform
(1) Where there are promises for an agreed exchange, if
one promisor manifests to the other that he cannot or will not
substantially perform his promise, or that, though able to do so,
he doubts whether he will substantially perform it, and the
statement is not conditional on the existence of facts that would
justify a failure to perform, and there are no such facts, the other
29. 433 F. Supp. at 444, (quoting 499 F.2d 951, 960 (8th Cir. 1974)).
30. 433 F. Supp. at 445. See Hal Roach Studios v. Film Classics, 156 F.2d 596 (2d
Cir. 1946); Hanson & Parker v. Wittenberg, 205 Mass. 319, 91 N.E. 383 (1910); Northwest
Lumber Sales, Inc. v. Continental Forest Prod., 261 Or. 480, 495 P.2d 744 (1972).
31. 433 F. Supp. at 446.
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party is justified in changing his position, and if he makes a
material change of position he is discharged from the duty of
performing his promise.
(2) The party making a statement within the rule stated
in Subsection (1) has power to nullify the effect of the statement
by a retraction, as long as the other party has not materially
changed his position."
The court, while pointing out that no South Carolina law is
available on this point, found that courts in other jurisdictions
agree with the law as set out in the Restatement.34 The court
refused to grant summary judgment for Ranger because under
section 280 a "question of fact for the jury existed whether plain-
tiff's refusal to pay defendant under their [prior contract] con-
stituted a manifestation to the defendant that plaintiff could not
or would not substantially perform his promise under the con-
tract." 5
The rationale behind the doctrine of prospective failure of
consideration is that although a party to a contract assumes the
risk that the other party will perform, performance should not be
required when it clearly will result only in a right to sue the other
party."6 Parties to a contract bargain for each other's perform-
ances, not for a lawsuit. Although the Restatement is not men-
tioned, the comments to section 2-609 of the Uniform Commercial
Code demonstrate that the provision is a lineal descendant of the
doctrine of prospective failure of consideration." While Dixie was
unable to utilize the Code provision directly because of the nature
33. Id.
34. 433 F. Supp. at 446. The court cited New York Life Ins. Co. v. Viglas, 297 U.S.
672 (1936), and Kimel v. Missouri Life Ins. Co., 71 F.2d 921 (10th Cir. 1934).
35. 433 F. Supp. at 446.
36. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 280, Comment a (1932).
37. See U.C.C. § 2-609, comment 1:
The section rests on the recognition of the fact that the essential purpose
of a contract between commercial men is actual performance and they do not
bargain merely for a promise, or for a promise plus the right to win a lawsuit
and that a continuing sense of reliance and security that the promised perform-
ance will be forthcoming when due, is an important feature of the bargain. If
either the willingness or the ability of a party to perform declines materially
between the time of contracting and the time for performance, the other party
is threatened with the loss of a substantial part of what he bargained for ....
1979]
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of the contract, it did succeed in having the court apply the
common-law rule from which the provision was derived.
38
Walter W. Theus, Jr.
38. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CoNRaCrs § 275 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1974) was de-
signed to replace section 280 of the First Restatement. It reads:
§ 275. When a Failure to Give Assurance May be Treated as a Repudiation
(1) Where reasonable grounds arise to believe that the obligor will commit
a breach that would of itself give the obligee a claim for damages under § 268,
the obligee may demand adequate assurance of due performance and may, if
reasonable, suspend any performance for which he has not already received the
agreed exchange until he receives such assurance.
(2) The obligee may treat the obligor's failure to provide within a reason-
able time such assurance of performance as is adequate in the circumstances of
the particular case as a repudiation.
The comments and reporter's notes to this section cite the UCC provision as its primary
source. The section demonstrates the manner in which the draftsmen of the Second
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